8/16 Michael Brown's Murder, Martial Law in Missouri: war in the 'Homeland', part 1

“At a time when we must seek to rebuild trust between law enforcement and the local community, I am deeply concerned that the deployment of military equipment and vehicles sends a conflicting message” Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.

8/16 Michael Brown: Police say teen was robbery suspect

Governor Declares Emergency and Curfew in Ferguson
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html
Gov. Jay Nixon of Missouri declared a state of emergency in the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson Saturday afternoon and ordered a curfew after hundreds of demonstrators engaged in a standoff with the police was punctuated by threats and a new round of denunciations of law enforcement...

Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement
Zbigniew Brezinski
MARCH 17, 1978 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP FOR AFRICA
This Document is Exhibit 10 of U.S. Supreme Court Case No.00-9587NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMORANDUM-46

Objective of our policy toward Black Africa is to prevent social upheavals which could radically change the political situation throughout the area. The success or failure of our policy in the region depends on the solution international and internal issues whose importance of the United States is on the increase.

II. A. U.S. INTERESTS IN BLACK AFRICA
A multiplicity of interests influences the U.S. attitude toward black Africa. The most important of these interests can be summarized as follows:

1. POLITICAL
If black African states assume attitudes hostile to the U.S. national interest, our policy toward the white regimes; which is a key element in our relations with the black states, may be subjected by the latter to great pressure for fundamental change. Thus the West may face a real danger of being deprived of access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa which are vital for our defense needs as well as losing control over the Cape sea routes by which approximately 65% of Middle Eastern oil is supplied to Western Europe.

Moreover, such a development may bring about internal political difficulties by intensifying the activity of the Black movement in the United States itself.

It should also be borne in mind that black Africa is an integral part of a continent where tribal and regional discord, economic backwardness, inadequate infrastructures, drought, and famine, are constant features of the scene. In conjunction with the artificial borders imposed by the former colonial powers, guerilla warfare in Rhodesia and widespread indignation against apartheid in South Africa, the above factors provide the communist states with ample opportunities for furthering their aims. This must necessarily redound to the detriment of U.S. political interests.

2. ECONOMIC
Black Africa is increasingly becoming an outlet for U.S. exports and investment. The mineral resources of the area continue to be of great value for the normal functioning of industry in the United States and allied countries. In 1977, U.S. direct investment in black Africa totaled about $1.8 billion and exports $2.2 billion. New prospect of substantial profits would continue to develop in the countries concerned.

IV. BLACK AFRICA AND THE U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT

Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests, the nationalist liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst with far reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions. Such a result would be likely as Zaire went the way of Angola and Mozambique.

An occurrence of the events of *1967-68 would do grievous harm to U.S. prestige, especially in view of the concern of the present Administration with human rights issues. Moreover, the Administration would have to take specific steps to stabilize the situation. Such steps might be misunderstood both inside and outside the United States.

In order to prevent such a trend and protect U.S. national security interests, it would appear essential to elaborate and carry out effective countermeasures.
1. Possibility of Joint Action By U.S. Black and African Nationalist Movement.
In elaborating U.S. policy toward black Africa, due weight must be given to the fact that there are 25 millions American blacks whose roots are African and who consciously or subconsciously sympathies with African nationalism.
The living conditions of the black population should also be taken into account. Immense advances in the field are accompanied by a long-lasting high rate of unemployment, especially among the youth and by poverty and dissatisfaction with government social welfare standards.
These factors taken together may provide a basis for joint actions of a concrete nature by the African nationalist movement and the U.S. black community... renewal of the extremist national idea of establishing an "African Republic" on American soil. Finally, leftist radical elements of the Black community could resume extremist actions in the style of the defunct Black Panther Party. ...
Basically, actions would take the form of demonstrations and public protests, but the likelihood of violence cannot be excluded. There would also be attempts to coordinate their political activity both locally and in international organizations.

In the context of long-term strategy, the United States can not afford a radical change in the fundamentals of its African policy, which is designed for maximum protection of national security. In the present case, emphasis is laid on the importance of Black Africa for U.S. political, economic and military interests.

RECOMMENDATIONS
In weighing the range of U.S. interests in Black Africa, basic recommendations arranged without intent to imply priority are:
1. Specific steps should be taken with the help of appropriate government agencies to inhibit coordinated activity of the Black Movement in the United States.
2. Special clandestine operations should be launched by the CIA to generate mistrust and hostility in American and world opinion against joint activity of the two forces, and to cause division among Black African radical national groups and their leaders.
3. U.S. embassies to Black African countries specially interested in southern Africa must be highly circumspect in view of the activity of certain political circles and influential individuals opposing the objectives and methods of U.S. policy toward South Africa. It must be kept in mind that the failure of U.S. strategy in South Africa would adversely affect American standing throughout the world. In addition, this would mean a significant diminution of U.S. influence in Africa and the emergence of new difficulties in our internal situation due to worsening economic prospects.
4. The FBI should mount surveillance operations against Black African representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the U.N., who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa. The information should include facts on their links with the leaders of the Black movement in the United States, thus making possible at least partial neutralization of the adverse effects of their activity.

B. THE RANGE OF POLICY OPTIONS
The concern for the future security of the United States makes necessary the range of policy options. Arranged without intent imply priority they are:
(a) to enlarge programs, within the framework of the present budget, for the improvement of the social and economic welfare of American Blacks in order to ensure continuing development of present trends in the Black movement;
(b) to elaborate and bring into effect a special program designed to perpetuate division in the Black movement and neutralize the most active groups of leftist radical organizations representing different social strata of the Black community: to encourage division in Black circles;
(c) to preserve the present climate which inhibits the emergence from within the Black leadership of a person capable of exerting nationwide appeal;
(d) to work out and realize preventive operations in order to impede durable ties between U.S Black organizations and radical groups in African states;
e) to support actions designed to sharpen social stratification in the Black community which would lead to the widening and perpetuation of the gap between successful educated Blacks and the poor, giving rise to growing antagonism between different Black groups and a weakening of the movement as a whole.
(f) to facilitate the greatest possible expansion of Black business by granting government contracts and loans with favorable terms to Black businessmen;
(g) to take every possible means through the AFL-CIO leaders to counteract the increasing influence of Black labor organizations which function in all major unions and in particular, the National Coalition of Black Trade Union and its leadership including the creation of real preference for adverse and hostile reaction among White trade unionists to demands for improvement of social and economic welfare of the Blacks;
(h) to support the nomination at federal and local levels of loyal Black public figures to elective offices, to government agencies and the Court.

“At a time when we must seek to rebuild trust between law enforcement and the local community, I am deeply concerned that the deployment of military equipment and vehicles sends a conflicting message” Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said...
While the major Homeland Security grants do not pay for weapons, Justice Department grants do...A Justice Department report last year said nearly 400 local police departments and more than 100 state agencies bought less-lethal weapons using Justice Department grant money... also paid for body armor, vehicles and surveillance equipment...sent machine guns, armored trucks, aircraft and other surplus war equipment to local departments. Compared with other urban areas St. Louis County has received little surplus military equipment...since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks....the Department of Homeland Security has spent more than a decade...[on] federal Grant programs in the name of fighting terrorism..Nick Gragnani, executive director of the St. Louis Area Regional Response System, which administers such grants for the area, said since 2003 it has spent $9.4 million on police equipment in St. Louis County....“The focus is terrorism, but crossover is allowed for other types of responses. It’s for any type of civil unrest....there no restriction on that by the federal government In Wake of Clashes, Calls to Demilitarize Police http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/us/ferguson-missouri-in-wake-of-clashe...

Fusion Centers
U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Information Sharing Office of Justice Programs
https://it.ojp.gov/ https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=nationalInitiatives&page=1181
As part of the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative's (Global) efforts to develop fusion center guidelines, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC), in support of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), recommended the creation of the Fusion Center Focus Group. This focus group was tasked with recommending guidelines to aid in the development and operation of fusion centers.
A fusion center is an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources. In addition, fusion centers are a conduit for implementing portions of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan(NCISP).

"To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities. We will continue to integrate and leverage state and major urban area fusion centers that have the capability to share classified information"
National Security Strategy (May 2010)