Post-Paris: WW3, ISIS and the US World Order

Digest commentary:
Midnight brings the biggest world names in every field to Charlie Rose’s table weeknights. His demeanor and first words announce US ‘friend or enemy’. Since Paris 2, many guests have been his best american military, diplomacy, intelligence, technology expert friends, all singing the same basic song from their expert vantage point, all sounding like the US post-911 Global Terror War began 14 days, not 14 years ago. And as if, in 2 weeks the entire geopolitical strategy “community” figured out that the problem and the solution to the failed GWOT are the same:
In keeping with its in-a-nutshell analysis, the digest sums up the state’s essential information war strategic communications/public diplomacy [SC/PD] conclusions to be heard 24/7 worldwide, gratuitously amplified with ever-evolving ‘narratives’

PROBLEM: US leadership hasn’t been strong enough. The world became fragmented, divided, disordered. ISIS filled the void. We’re seeing how even ‘bad authoritarian’ order is better than no order. Russia’s intervention in Syria exacerbated problems by undermining the US strategy that Obama said it didn’t have, by bombing US/west-supported anti-Assad government ‘moderate rebels’ which don’t exist. Please see the digest to fill in the missing desperate GWOT years - which in fact is WW3 to salvage the collapsing US post-WW2 global dictatorship.

SOLUTION: ISIS terror is the basis for creating a strong US-led international coalition uniting all countries despite competing interests, policies and cultures because everyone wants to avoid a ‘major war’, including Russia, China and Iran.

Part 1 bears serious study: following a succinct summary of the imperialist crisis from a major think-tank, the official US framework for understanding the post WW2 era and WW3, by whatever name. Again, please find a dozen crucial years of information on the burbank website, or in emails if you’re an email subscriber.
Part 2 to follow soon.
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The Crisis of World Order
Nov. 20, 2015 http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-crisis-of-world-order-1448052095
After Paris, Islamic State’s rise and Syria’s agony are shaking a weakened Europe—and the international system. Can the U.S. summon the resolve to respond?
...The combined crises of Syria, Iraq and Islamic State have not been contained. Islamic State itself has proven both durable and capable, as the attacks in Paris showed. The Syrian conflict, with its exodus of refugees, is destabilizing Lebanon and Jordan and has put added pressure on Turkey’s already tenuous democracy. It has exacerbated the acute conflict between Sunnis and Shiites across the region.
The multisided war in the Middle East has now ceased to be a strictly Middle Eastern problem. It has become a European problem as well. The flood of refugees from the violence in Syria and the repression of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime have rocked the continent and overwhelmed its institutions. The horrific attacks in Paris, likely organized and directed by Islamic State from its base in Syria, and the prospect of more such attacks, threaten the cohesion of Europe, and with it the cohesion of the trans-Atlantic community, or what used to be known as the West. The crisis on the periphery, in short, has now spilled over into the core...
Even after the iconic American victory in World War II, the U.S. didn’t come home. Keeping a lid on things is exactly what the U.S. has done these past 70 years. That is how the U.S. created this liberal world order.
Mr. Kagan a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, author of “Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order” and, “The World America Made.”

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Defense Planning Guidance: “Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival'
NYT March 8, 1992, Sunday http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D7173AF93BA35750C0A...

This Defense Planning guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its coalition allies over Iraqi aggression -- the first post-cold-war conflict and a defining event in U.S. global leadership. In addition to these two victories, there has been a less visible one, the integration of Germany and Japan into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic "zone of peace".
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. Three additional aspects to this objective:
First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.
Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.
Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. An effective reconstitution capability is important here, since it implies a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily gain a predominant military position in the world.

The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems. These objectives are especially important in deterring conflicts or threats in regions of security importance to the United States because of their proximity (such as Latin America), or where we have treaty obligations or security commitments to other nations. While the U.S. cannot become the world's "policeman," we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of U.S. interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats from terrorism or regional or local conflict and narcotics trafficking....

It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will re-emerge from the Eurasian heartland for many years to come. Even in the highly unlikely event that some future leadership in the former Soviet Union adopted strategic aims of recovering the lost empire or otherwise threatened global interests, the loss of Warsaw Pact allies and the subsequent and continuing dissolution of military capability would make any hope of success require several years or more of strategic and doctrinal re-orientation and force regeneration and redeployment, which in turn could only happen after a lengthy political realignment and re-orientation to aggressive political and economic control. Furthermore, any such political upheaval in or among the states of the former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or localized hostilities, rather than a concerted strategic effort to marshal capabilities for external expansionism -- the ability to project power beyond their borders.

There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. But because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge. . . .

REGIONAL THREATS AND RISK
With the demise of a global military threat to U.S. interests, regional military threats, including possible conflicts arising in and from the territory of the former Soviet Union, will be of primary concern to the U.S. in the future. These threats are likely to arise in regions critical to the security of the U.S. and its allies, including Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important interests at stake in Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In both cases, the U.S. will be concerned with preventing the domination of key regions by a hostile power. . . .

Former Soviet Union
The former Soviet state achieved global reach and power by consolidating control over the resources in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union is to support its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) in their efforts to become democracies with market-based economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome for the U.S. At the same time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will fail, with the potential a regime bent on regenerating aggressive military power could emerge in Russia, or that similar regimes in other successor republics could lead to spreading conflict within the former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe....
For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries....

Western Europe
NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the U.S. supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure....

East-Central Europe
The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have gone a long way toward increasing stability and reducing the military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in the Russian republic, should this process continue, is likely to create a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe. However, the U.S. must keep in mind the long history of conflict between the states of Eastern Europe, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union ... The most promising avenues for anchoring the east-central Europeans to the West and stabilizing their democratic institutions is their participation in Western political and economic organizations. East-central European membership in the EC at the earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO liaisons. . . .
The U.S. could also consider extending to the east-central European states security commitments analogous to those we have extended to Persian Gulf states....Should there be a re-emergence of a threat from the Soviet Union's successor state, we should defend against such a threat in Eastern Europe, if there is an alliance decision to do so.

East Asia and Pacific
...Defense of Korea will likely remain one of the most demanding major regional contingencies...Asia is home to the world's greatest concentration of traditional Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies decidedly at variance with our own and those of our friends and allies.
To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area to enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon....

Middle East and Southwest Asia
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a strong role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security....
We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive U.S.-Pakistani military relationship will be an important element in our strategy of stable security conditions in Southwest Asia and Central Asia. We should therefore rebuild our military relationship given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns...

Latin America
Cuba's growing domestic crisis holds out the prospect for positive change, but over the near term Cuba's tenuous internal situation is likely to generate new challenges to U.S. policy. Consequently, our programs must provide capabilities to meet a variety of Cuban contingencies which could include an attempted repetition of the Mariel boatlift, a military provocation against the U.S. or an American ally, or political instability and internal conflict in Cuba.