TRUMP Card: Geopolitical Analysts

Chaos Strategy in action..
Attack in the Heart of Europe
12/16/16 STRATFOR INTELLIGENCE Geopolitical Analysis https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/attack-heart-europe
The Berlin incident will shape politics across the Continent nudging many states farther to the right.

ORDER FROM CHAOs: FOREIGN POLICY IN A TROUBLED WORLD
A guide for managing the end of the post-Cold War era.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/11/21/give-flynn-a-...
U.S. Defense & National Security U.S. Foreign Policy

NOW (NewWorldOrder) Chaos Strategy – Manufactured Terrorism
https://thewallwillfall.org/2015/02/20/nwo-chaos-strategy-manufactured-t...
By Daniel Mabsout 2014 vanessa beeley / February 20, 2015
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Obama Says Trump Seeks to Assure Leaders of US-NATO Commitment
Bloomberg https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-11-14/
President doubts Trump will undo Iran nuclear deal
Obama to reassure foreign leaders Trump ready to lead
The president to depart for meeting European leaders in Greece and Germany and Asian and Pacific leaders in Peru, where he’ll assure foreign leaders the billionaire real-estate developer will be ready to lead the free world by his Jan. 20 inauguration. Describing Trump as more pragmatist than ideologue, Obama, who met with the president-elect at the White House last Thursday, made the case that the international diplomacy turn the U.S. takes might not be as sharp as campaign rhetoric suggested....

DIFFERENT ANALYST ANGLES ON LAST DITCH U.S. ATTEMPT TO SAVE A ‘LEADERSHIP’ ROLE-- NO LONGER SOLE GLOBAL RULER
All analysts selected by the digest are heavyweight ‘communicators’, few with ‘enjoyable’ irony like this first one:
IRAN IS ENJOYING OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
By Robin Wright 10/19/16 http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/iran-is-enjoying-our-presidentia...
For Tehran, the most important U.S. election prism is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ‘nuclear deal’. A weekly business magazine, Tejarat Farda, ran a cover story on Clinton and Trump “Which is worse for the J.C.P.O.A.?”...
The first season of the Netflix “House of Cards,” series about demonic American politician Frank Underwood and his duplicitous wife, Claire made its début on Iranian television in time for the finale of U.S. elections...in Farsi dubbed— “Khaneh Poushaly,”, “House of Straw”— every night for two weeks.
Iranian television broadcast the October 9th American presidential debate live, in simultaneous translation— in which Donald Trump denied sexually assaulting women and threatened to put Hillary Clinton in prison if elected....As for Trump, hard-line media outlets and reformist ones alike have portrayed him as a buffoon. Cartoons highlighting his orange skin and matching pompadour rival any in the American press.
Fars superimposed Trump’s face on the Statue of Liberty; instead of holding a torch, he’s thrusting an assault rifle into the air. Skulls lie at his feet...
Mashregh News, a non-governmental news website commented “House of Cards has skillfully shown the deception in the complicated political sphere of liberal American civilization, as well as the treason, power-hungry, promiscuities and crimes behind those ruling in the country.“

FARS News link & quote added by theburbankdigest: “In the American version, Kevin Spacey has brought to life Southern politician Francis "Frank" Underwood with such panache that he stands alongside Ian Richardson’s upper-class British politician Francis Urquhart as a unique creation, alike in treachery and wit, yet utterly distinctive. It’s a superb achievement”

Foad Izadi, a conservative analyst with Tehran University’s Faculty of World Studies, told me the authorities allow the broadcasts because “...Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton are seen as manipulative, corrupt, and dishonest, engaging in unethical behavior in their personal and political lives.”
Iranian newspapers run front-page caricatures of Trump and Clinton to illustrate their accusations against each other. The video of Trump’s salacious conversation with “Access Hollywood” host Billy Bush made the front pages of nineteen Iranian newspapers. “Is This the End of the Populist?” one headline in Jahan-e Eqtesad asked.

Trump’s allegations of U.S. election being rigged particularly resonated across Iranian media... in some ways, revenge. In 2009, the reëlection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was marred by fraud allegation. The Iranian “Green Movement” demonstrations that challenged the theocracy across the country, were sparked and sustained sporadically by social media for over six months. Supreme Leader Khamenei’s website charged foreign agents with a “velvet revolution” citing a 2009 Secretary of State Clinton speech at Georgetown University, expressing “solidarity with those inside Iran struggling for democratic change...I’ve established a special unit inside the State Department to use technology for twenty-first-century statecraft.” We can help change agents gain access to and share information through the Internet and mobile phones so they can communicate and organize. With camera phones and Facebook pages, thousands of protesters in Iran broadcast demands for denied rights, creating a record for the world including Iran’s leaders, to see.” She also said at Georgetown that “We have offered to negotiate directly with the government on nuclear issues.”

Wright, a former Washington Post, CBS News, Los Angeles Times, and Sunday Times of London correspondent, has reported from more than a hundred and forty countries. Currently a joint fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, she was also a fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as at Yale, Duke, Dartmouth, and the University of California, Santa Barbara. Wright received the U.N. Correspondents Association Gold Medal for international coverage, and the Overseas Press Club Award for the “best reporting in any medium requiring exceptional courage and initia­tive,” for her coverage of African wars. The American Academy of Diplomacy named her its journalist of the year for “distinguished reporting and analysis of international affairs.” She also won the National Press Club Award for diplomatic reporting and was the recipient of a MacArthur Foundation grant. She is the author of several books, including “The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran,” “Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam,” and “Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East,” selected by the New York Times and the Washington Post as one of the most notable books of 2008. Her most recent book,“Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World,” was selected as the best book on international affairs by the Overseas Press Club.

The Once and Future Order
What Comes After Hegemony?
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/once-and-future-order By Michael J. Mazarr
Few foreign policy issues have attracted more attention in recent years than the problem of sustaining the U.S.-led liberal international order. After World War II, the United States sponsored institutions, rules, and norms designed to avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1930s and promote peace, prosperity, and democracy. The resulting system has served as the bedrock of U.S. national security strategy ever since. In everything from arms control to peacekeeping to trade to human rights, marrying U.S. power and international norms and institutions has achieved sig­nificant results. Washington continues to put maintaining the international order at the center of the US global role.
Yet the survival of that order—indeed, of any ordering principles at all—now seems in question. Dissatisfied countries such as China and Russia view its operation as unjust, and people around the world are angry about the economic and social price they’ve had to pay for globalization.
It’s not clear exactly what President-elect Donald Trump’s views are on the role of the United States in the world, much less the liberal order, but his administration will confront the most profound foreign policy task that any new administration has faced in 70 years: rethinking the role that the international order should play in U.S. grand strategy. Whatever Trump’s own views, the instincts of many in Washington will be to attempt to restore a unified, U.S.-dominated system by confronting the rule breakers and aggressively promoting liberal values. This would be the wrong approach; in trying to hold the old order together, Washington could end up accelerating its dissolution. What the United States must learn to do instead is navigate and lead the more diversified, pluralistic system that is now materializing—one with a bigger role for emerging-market powers and more ways for countries other than the United States to lead than the current order provides.
THE HOUSE THAT WE BUILT Subscriber free access to articla

The Trump Doctrine: A Work in Progress
Stratfor Intelligence Geopolitical Weekly 11/20/16 https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/trump-doctrine-work-progress
The world is in a "frenzy of study," Henry Kissinger said in a recent interview. At home and abroad, strategists and pundits are trying to piece together a blueprint of American foreign policy under U.S. President-elect Donald Trump from a stream of tweets, some campaign slogans, a few eye-catching Cabinet picks, meetings at Trump Tower, and a pingpong match already underway with Beijing. Highbrow intellectualism can be a handicap in this exercise. Commentators among the Washington establishment have been quick to dismiss Trump's foreign policy moves outright as erratic and self-serving over the past few weeks. In an op-ed entitled "Trump Failed His First Foreign Policy Test," for instance, columnist David Ignatius admonished the president-elect for the "hot mess" his phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen precipitated. Trump makes people uncomfortable. It's what he does best, in fact. But how this quality applies to foreign policy is a question that merits deeper exploration than knee-jerk displays of stricken disbelief. After all, as Kissinger noted in his Dec. 18 interview, "a president has to have some core convictions." So what are Trump's? From what we can discern so far.....
Trump prizes business acumen and a "killer" instinct for managing affairs. He has enough corporate firepower in his Cabinet to fill the next Forbes' list. By nominating ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson as secretary of state, he has demonstrated his belief that tough deal-making — identifying sources of leverage and showing a willingness to use them — is the secret to running a country and presiding over the international system. Trump does not fear nationalism; he sees it as the natural and rightful path for every state, the United States included, to pursue in protecting its interests. He also seems to have internalized the idea that the United States is losing its competitiveness and that internationalist foreign policy is to blame. Finally, Trump apparently believes that U.S. foreign policy has become too predictable and overwrought with diplomatic formality....This, at least, is the worldview at a distance. When we come in for a closer look, however, some of the cracks come into clearer view..

Keeping the World on Its Toes
Perhaps the greatest difference between the Obama and Trump foreign policies lies in what may be Trump's biggest virtue: his unpredictability. Obama has been criticized as overly cautious in his foreign policy and thus too much of a known entity for U.S. adversaries. Trump, on the other hand, gives the impression that he is willing to throw caution to the wind and rely on instinct in shaping foreign policy. This matters immensely for U.S. allies and adversaries alike that have to be kept on their toes in developing their long-term strategy while avoiding the unexpected with the world's superpower.
Regardless of who occupies the presidency, the United States' strong geopolitical foundation gives it options. As opposed to more vulnerable countries in less forgiving locales, the United States, buffered as it is by two vast oceans, can debate the merits of isolationism and intervention. George Kennan, a diplomat during the Cold War era, may have captured the immense power of the country's unpredictability best:

"[American democracy is like] one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: He lives there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath — in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat."
Aloofness in international affairs is a geopolitical luxury but it cannot be taken for granted. That may be the basis for the Trump doctrine.
"The Trump Doctrine: A Work in Progress republished with permission of Stratfor."

‘’yesterday’ the US dominated the world politically, economically and scientifically. But today?
What Does A 'Post-American World' Look Like?
June 30, 20119:40 AM ET http://www.npr.org/2011/06/30/137522219/what-does-a-post-american-world-...
Excerpted from The Post-American World: Release 2.0 by Fareed Zakaria.
BIO: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fareed_Zakaria
...The emerging international system is likely to be quite different from those that have preceded it. One hundred years ago, there was a multipolar order run by a collection of European governments, with constantly shifting alliances, rivalries, miscalculations, and wars. Then came the bipolar duopoly of the Cold War, more stable in many ways, but with the superpowers reacting and overreacting to each other's every move. Since 1991, we have lived under an American imperium, a unique, unipolar world in which the open global economy has expanded and accelerated dramatically. This expansion is now driving the next change in the nature of the international order.
The rise of the rest is at heart an economic phenomenon, but it has consequences for nearly every other sphere of life. At the politico — military level, we remain in a single — superpower world. But in all other dimensions — industrial, financial, educational, social, cultural — the distribution of power is shifting away from American dominance. That does not mean we are entering an anti — American world. But we are moving into a post — American world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people.
As countries become stronger and richer, we're likely to see more challenges and greater assertiveness from rising nations. In one month in 2008, India and Brazil were willing to frontally defy the United States at the Doha trade talks, Russia attacked and occupied parts of Georgia, and China hosted the most spectacular and expensive Olympic Games in history. Ten years ago, not one of the four would have been powerful or confident enough to act as it did. Even if their growth rates decline, which they surely will, these countries will not quietly relinquish their new roles in the global system....

Liberalism in Retreat Demise of a Dream
By Robin Niblett https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/liberalism-retreat
The liberal international order has always depended on the idea of progress. Since 1945, Western policymakers have believed that open markets, democracy, and individual human rights would gradually spread across the entire globe. Today, such hopes seem naive.
In Asia, the rise of China threatens to challenge U.S. military and economic hegemony, as Beijing seeks to draw American allies such as the Philippines and Thailand into its political orbit. In the Middle East, the United States and its European allies have failed to guide the region toward a more liberal and peaceful future in the wake of the Arab Spring and have proved powerless to halt the conflict in Syria. Russia’s geopolitical influence has reached heights unseen since the Cold War, as the country attempts to roll back liberal advances on its periphery.
But the more important threats to the order are internal. For over 50 years, the European Union seemed to represent the advance guard of a new liberalism in which nations pool sovereignty and cooperate ever more closely But today, as it reels from one crisis to the next, the EU has stopped expanding. After the British vote to leave the bloc last June, it will probably shrink for the first time in its history.
Across the ocean, U.S. commitment to global leadership, which until now has sustained the order through good times and bad, looks weaker than at any point since World War II....president-elect Donald Trump ran on an explicitly “America First” platform, pledged to renegotiate U.S. trade deals, praised Russian President Vladimir Putin, and called into question U.S. commitments to NATO. Meanwhile...Obama’s “rebalance” to Asia has struggled to take off. Beijing wasted no time laying out its own vision for a more integrated Eurasia that may exclude the United States, in which China will play the leading role....

THE FUTURE OF THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER
G. John Ikenberry published by the Council on Foreign Relations
There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal...not only is US preeminence passing, so is the rule-based international order the country has championed since post WW2
...powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism... enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries.
The fact today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the US to act as global leader....
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The Trump Doctrine: A Work in Progress
Stratfor Intelligence Geopolitical Weekly 11/20/16 https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/trump-doctrine-work-progress
The world is in a "frenzy of study," Henry Kissinger said in a recent interview. At home and abroad, strategists and pundits are trying to piece together a blueprint of American foreign policy under U.S. President-elect Donald Trump from a stream of tweets, some campaign slogans, a few eye-catching Cabinet picks, meetings at Trump Tower, and a pingpong match already underway with Beijing. Highbrow intellectualism can be a handicap in this exercise. Commentators among the Washington establishment have been quick to dismiss Trump's foreign policy moves outright as erratic and self-serving over the past few weeks. In an op-ed entitled "Trump Failed His First Foreign Policy Test," for instance, columnist David Ignatius admonished the president-elect for the "hot mess" his phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen precipitated. Trump makes people uncomfortable. It's what he does best, in fact. But how this quality applies to foreign policy is a question that merits deeper exploration than knee-jerk displays of stricken disbelief. After all, as Kissinger noted in his Dec. 18 interview, "a president has to have some core convictions." So what are Trump's? From what we can discern so far.....
Trump prizes business acumen and a "killer" instinct for managing affairs. He has enough corporate firepower in his Cabinet to fill the next Forbes' list. By nominating ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson as secretary of state, he has demonstrated his belief that tough deal-making — identifying sources of leverage and showing a willingness to use them — is the secret to running a country and presiding over the international system. Trump does not fear nationalism; he sees it as the natural and rightful path for every state, the United States included, to pursue in protecting its interests. He also seems to have internalized the idea that the United States is losing its competitiveness and that internationalist foreign policy is to blame. Finally, Trump apparently believes that U.S. foreign policy has become too predictable and overwrought with diplomatic formality....This, at least, is the worldview at a distance. When we come in for a closer look, however, some of the cracks come into clearer view..

Keeping the World on Its Toes
Perhaps the greatest difference between the Obama and Trump foreign policies lies in what may be Trump's biggest virtue: his unpredictability. Obama has been criticized as overly cautious in his foreign policy and thus too much of a known entity for U.S. adversaries. Trump, on the other hand, gives the impression that he is willing to throw caution to the wind and rely on instinct in shaping foreign policy. This matters immensely for U.S. allies and adversaries alike that have to be kept on their toes in developing their long-term strategy while avoiding the unexpected with the world's superpower.
Regardless of who occupies the presidency, the United States' strong geopolitical foundation gives it options. As opposed to more vulnerable countries in less forgiving locales, the United States, buffered as it is by two vast oceans, can debate the merits of isolationism and intervention. George Kennan, a diplomat during the Cold War era, may have captured the immense power of the country's unpredictability best:

"[American democracy is like] one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: He lives there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath — in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat."
Aloofness in international affairs is a geopolitical luxury but it cannot be taken for granted. That may be the basis for the Trump doctrine.

"The Trump Doctrine: A Work in Progress republished with permission of Stratfor."

Is the foundation of the US-led order crumbling?
12/15/16 Center for Strategic and International Studies https://www.csis.org/analysis/foundation-us-led-order-crumbling
by Michael J. Green Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair
Americas, Asia, Asia Program, Defense and Security, Europe, Geopolitics and International Security, Japan Chair, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia
MEDIA QUERIES Contact H. Andrew Schwartz CSIS Chief Communications Officer
...The traditional postwar foundations of the U.S.-led international order are thus all under some duress, but far from crumbling. That then leads to the new sources of entropy in the international system that were never conceived when the postwar order was being constructed: namely, the global threats that emanate from globalization and nonstate actors. Interestingly, the Bush and Obama administrations both argued in their first National Security Strategy documents that global challenges could unite geopolitical rivals and stabilize international order. For Bush, of course, it was the common front against terrorism, and for Obama it was cooperation on the threat of climate change. Both administrations were correct in part. Great power relations did stabilize somewhat because of the global war on terror, while one of the few positive areas of cooperation in U.S.-China relations today is in the area of climate change. The Bush administration also built greater international cooperation and trust around the international cooperation to meet the avian influenza threat and the Obama administration rallied international support to deal with the Zika virus. At the same time, it is clearly not the case that cooperation on global challenges fundamentally changed geopolitics as the current tensions in U.S.-China relations demonstrate. To date these global challenges have neither weakened nor strengthened the foundations of the U.S. international order in any significant way. On the other hand, there could be catastrophic impact on global order should climate change cause fights for scarce water resources or destabilize whole states—or should animal-to-human transmission of a deadly virus force the closure of international flights and trade in the event of an unprecedented international pandemic. Technology also accelerates the impacts of globalization as nuclear and especially biological weapons become more accessible, while the internet of things and thus the global economy itself becomes more vulnerable to cyberattack.
What is one to think of global order given these new scenarios? It would not be accurate to say that the foundations of the U.S.-led global order are crumbling as a result of globalization and technology. These are still largely hypothetical scenarios after all, despite the reality of the technology that could drive them. Indeed, information technology could accelerate change in other directions as well. 3-D printing could re-concentrate economic competitiveness around the United States, for example, and social media penetration could ultimately tip the scales in favor of freedom even if authoritarian governments have skillfully used the internet to create an impasse for now.

Yet the conclusion for policymakers and strategists should be the same either way. The foundations of the neoliberal order are not crumbling, but they have been shaken from within and without and could be destroyed in the most cataclysmic scenarios resulting from globalization and diffusion of advanced technologies. The answer is to begin reinforcing resilience and strengthening from within. If the core is American capacity and willpower, there is still much to work with, but it will require rebuilding the case for international leadership in the wake of this very damaging election. The next concentric circle is the U.S. network of bilateral and regional alliances, bound by common interests and values. This second ring must be reinforced with greater jointness, interoperability, and common purpose within and among U.S. alliances, including renewed efforts at defense modernization, trade liberalization, and collective global support for democratic rules and norms. The ability to dissuade revisionism by nondemocratic powers will in turn depend on solidarity within what was known as the “West”— but now includes many more democratic partners in the Far East. Ultimately the US--led regional order will depend on sharing power with a rising China and India...But strengthening the core of the international system must come before compromises are made to the rules and norms that make that system function.
Ultimately, it will depend on leadership. When we needed Truman, Adenauer, and Yoshida, we had them. When we needed Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl, and Nakasone, we had them once again. We now need leaders who can harness their citizens to defend and expand freedom and prosperity, yet liberal democracies are serving up a disappointing mix of transactional, populist, and ineffective heads of state. History suggests there is nothing permanent about the nature of leadership, though. New leadership may emerge precisely because liberal democracies have something fundamental their citizens will want them to defend. Making that point is the first task of the next generation of leaders we need.

STRATEGIC VISION Toward a Global Realignment
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, Volume 11, Number 6 April 17, 2016 http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-a-global-realignm...
As its era of global dominance ends, the United States needs to take the lead in realigning the global power architecture....
The fact is there has never been a truly “dominant” global power until the emergence of America on the world scene. Imperial Great Britain came close to becoming one, but World War I and later World War II not only bankrupted it but also prompted the emergence of rival regional powers. The decisive new global reality was the appearance on the world scene of America as simultaneously the richest and militarily the most powerful player. During the latter part of the 20th century no other power even came close.
That era is now ending. While no state is likely in the near future to match America’s economic-financial superiority, new weapons systems could suddenly endow some countries with the means to commit suicide in a joint tit-for-tat embrace with the United States, or even to prevail. Without going into speculative detail, the sudden acquisition by some state of the capacity to render America militarily inferior would spell the end of America’s global role. The result would most probably be global chaos. And that is why it behooves the United States to fashion a policy in which at least one of the two potentially threatening states becomes a partner in the quest for regional and then wider global stability, thus in containing the least predictable but potentially the most likely rival to overreach. Currently, the more likely to overreach is Russia, but in the longer run it could be China.
Since the next twenty years may well be the last phase of the more traditional and familiar political alignments with which we have grown comfortable, the response needs to be shaped now. During the rest of this century, humanity will also have to be increasingly preoccupied with survival as such on account of a confluence of environmental challenges. Those challenges can only be addressed responsibly and effectively in a setting of increased international accommodation based on a strategic vision that recognizes the urgent need for a new geopolitical framework.

*The author acknowledges the helpful contribution of his research assistant Paul Wasserman, and the scholarship on the subject of colonial brutality by Adam Hochschild, Richard Pierce, William Polk, and the Watson Institute at Brown University, among others.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, counselor, director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter 1977-81... author, most recently, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.

Brzezinski: foreign policy issues facing next president
Center fir Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Zbigniew Brzezinski
11/7/16 CNN video: https://www.csis.org/people/zbigniew-k-brzezinski
ZB:...”...i think it would very good if the new president makes every effort to engage at the highest levels to achieve at least minimum consensus”

Russia Must Work With, Not Against America in Syria
Zbigniew Brzezinski https://www.ft.com/content/c1ec2488-6aa8-11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a
... Russian naval and air presences in Syria are vulnerable, isolated geographically from their homeland. They could be “disarmed” if they persist in provoking the US. But, better still, Russia might be persuaded to act with the US in seeking a wider accommodation to a regional problem that transcends the interests of a single state. Were that to happen, even some limited American-Russian political and military collaboration on the Middle East might prompt a further positive geopolitical development: constructive engagement on the part of China...

Follow Brzezinski at https://twitter.com/zbig

Obama’s West Point speech focused largely on terrorism but did not address more complex challenges created by post-hegemonic chao
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig 3 Jun 2014

The 2003 Iraq War unleashed the unraveling of the post-World War I Mideast map
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig 11 Jun 2014

Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig 9 Oct 2014
US/NATO contingency plan in case of collapse of the Ukraine-Russia ceasefire?

US and Russian cooperation in Syria could be beneficial not only for the MidEast but also for US-Sino relations.
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig 5 Oct 2015

The ultimate threat to America is not the various conflicts around the world but our paralyzed political system.
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig Feb 24

Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig Apr 18
Emerging redistribution of global political power signals a global realignment. My new article explores US role:
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/17/toward-a-global-realignm...

The US needs a strategic rethink of its evolving global role given China’s rise and Russia’s perplexity.
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig May 6

Why is US endangering its interests by creating a situation in Asia where China feels no choice but to wrench up relations with Russia?
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig Jun 15

Lack of a strategic American vision could turn Russo-Sino cooperation from a paper tiger into something much more worrisome
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig Aug 31

Can Trump project a steady tone with historic vision and commitment while also understanding how the world is dramatically changing?
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig Dec 7

The American public and the global community need a major speech by Trump on foreign affairs that will set the tone for his administration.
Zbigniew Brzezinski ‏@zbig Dec 9