7/11 U.S. Hard-Soft Power Merger: A Trajectory of Geostrategic Destruction, Death & Defeat: part 1, Expanding "AF-PAK"

digest: soft power diplomacy and propaganda run by the State Dept. is merged with hard power, under Pentagon direction. On every continent, in every country 'of interest' to bipartisan US ruling finance capital ', a losing battle to secure amerikan political-economic-military control against undefeatable national resistance by bullets, bribery, ballots...Destroying the world and the planet in the name of 'liberation' and 'human rights'.

"The principal beneficiary of America's foreign assistance programs has always been the United States."
US Agency for International Development Source: "Direct Economic Benefits of U.S. Assistance Programs," 1999

"If war aims are stated which seem to be solely concerned with Anglo-American imperialism, they will offer little to people in the rest of the world. The interests of other peoples should be stressed. This would have a better propaganda effect."
- Private memo from The Council of Foreign Relations to the US State Department, 1941

'Strategic nonviolent struggle is all about political power.' And I thought, 'Boy is this guy speaking my language,' that is what armed struggle is about."
—Col. Robert Helvey

Gen. Petraeus: US civilian-military team must mesh
2010-07-03... They were Petraeus' first public comments since he arrived Friday night to take command of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. "Civilian and military, Afghanistan and international, we are part of one team with one mission," Petraeus told about 1,700 invited guests, including Afghan government and military and police officials gathered at the U.S. Embassy for a pre-Fourth of July celebration marking American independence.The gathering was upbeat. A rock band played. Dignitaries sat in tents eating popcorn, hamburgers, fried chicken, cupcakes and ice cream. Tiny American flags lined the sidewalks of the U.S. Embassy compound, which was adorned in red, white and blue bunting.The positive tone, however, was dampened by talk of Friday's attack on a four-story house used by an American aid organization, part of a militant campaign against international development organizations at a time when the U.S. and its allies are trying to accelerate the civilian aid effort to turn back the Taliban, and the accidental killing of civilians during a raid in the south....

David Petraeus has cautioned against using tactics that undermine strategic U.S. goals in Afghanistan — raising the question of what exactly are the U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. A debate inside the U.S. camp has emerged over this very question, the outcome of which is likely to determine the future of the region.
Stratfor: The Strategic Debate Over Afghanistan
11 May 2009, By George Friedman
After U.S. airstrikes killed scores of civilians in western Afghanistan this past week, White House National Security Adviser Gen. James L. Jones said the United States would continue with the airstrikes and would not tie the hands of U.S. generals fighting in Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus has cautioned against using tactics that undermine strategic U.S. goals in Afghanistan — raising the question of what exactly are the U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. A debate inside the U.S. camp has emerged over this very question, the outcome of which is likely to determine the future of the region.
On one side are President Barack Obama, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and a substantial amount of the U.S. Army leadership. On the other side are Petraeus — the architect of U.S. strategy in Iraq after 2006 — and his staff and supporters. An Army general — even one with four stars — is unlikely to overcome a president and a defense secretary; even the five-star Gen. Douglas MacArthur couldn’t pull that off. But the Afghan debate is important, and it provides us with a sense of future U.S. strategy in the region... Obama and Gates have stated that the goal in Afghanistan is the defeat of al Qaedaand the denial of bases for the group in Afghanistan. This is a very different strategic goal than in Iraq, because this goal does not require a coalition government or a reconciliation of political elements. Rather, it requires an agreement with one entity: the Taliban. If the Taliban agree to block al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan, the United States will have achieved its goal. Therefore, the challenge in Afghanistan is using U.S. power to give the Taliban what they want — a return to power — in exchange for a settlement on the al Qaeda question....Gates and Obama are not convinced that the endgame in Iraq, perhaps the best outcome that was possible there, is actually all that desirable for Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, this outcome would leave the Taliban in power in the end. No amount of U.S. troops could match the Taliban’s superior intelligence capability, their knowledge of the countryside and their willingness to take casualties in pursuing their ends, and every Afghan security force would be filled with Taliban agents...From the Obama and Gates point of view, a political settlement would call for either a constellation of forces in Afghanistan favoring some accommodation with the Americans, or sufficient American power to compel accommodation. But it is not clear to Obama and Gates that either could exist in Afghanistan....
The most important issues concern the extent to which Obama wants to stake his presidency on Petraeus’ vision in Afghanistan, and how important Afghanistan is to U.S. grand strategy. Petraeus has conceded that al Qaeda is in Pakistan. Getting the group out of Pakistan requires surgical strikes. Occupation and regime change in Pakistan are way beyond American abilities. The question of what the United States expects to win in Afghanistan — assuming it can win anything there — remains....Petraeus is a soldier in a fight, and he wants to win. But in the end, as Clausewitz said, war is an extension of politics by other means.

bipartisan ruling class state decides on 'final solution' against defeat
Afghan War: Petraeus Expands U.S. Military Presence Throughout Eurasia
July 4 General David Petraeus assumed command of 142,000 U.S. and NATO troops in the Afghan capital of Kabul as chief of all foreign troops in Afghanistan, those serving under U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/Operation Enduring Freedom and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). He now commands military units from 46 official troop contributing nations and others from several additional countries not officially designated as such but with forces in or that will soon be deployed to Afghanistan, such as Egypt, Jordan and Colombia....expanding the scope of the greater Afghan war throughout ...'the broader Middle East' – from Egypt in the West to Kazakhstan in the East, taking in Iraq and the rest of the Persian Gulf region, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and all of Central and much of South Asia...At the time leading U.S.- NATO allies link counterinsurgency wars in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden regions as extensions of the Global War on Terror from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Yemen and Somalia.
Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order. A UPI feature last month indicated part of the order’s designs:
"The recent disclosure that the U.S. military is expanding its covert operations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa is widely seen as a dangerous precedent, with Iran as one of the main targets….Officials stressed that the directive…permits operations that could pave the way toward possible military attacks against Iran if the confrontation over Tehran’s nuclear program worsens." [11]This March the U.S. Defense Department’s website featured an article entitled "Centcom Looks Beyond Iraq, Afghanistan, Petraeus Says" in which, in addition to discussing counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan and Yemen, "Petraeus told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States must remain vigilant in overseeing broader security challenges throughout the region. "Petraeus called Iran the 'primary state-level threat’ in the Middle East. He told the panel that Iran undermines security throughout the region in its efforts to gain nuclear weapons, which threatens a broader arms race, and uses its paramilitary force to influence Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Afghanistan and the Gulf region." [12]

U.S. 'secret war' expands globally as Special Operations forces take larger role
The 104 acre U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which costs $1.5 billion a year to run, is now going to be replicated by another colossal embassy in Islamabad. What will the war in Pakistan cost? Then there are the "counter-narcotics" and anti-terrorist military construction projects to be built in Tajikistan and Kyrgzstan.[The] US is building a $100 million permanent installation for Army Special Forces in northern Afghanistan. This will cover 17 acres, with supporting facilities including roads, power production system and electrical distribution, water well, non-potable water production, water storage, water distribution, sanitary sewer collection system, communication manhole/duct system, curbs, walkways, drainage and parking. It will take one year to build, the date at which U.S. forces were supposed to leave...Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, in their book The Three Trillion Dollar War,(2008), estimate the total U.S. liability just for the Iraq war to that point would be about $3 trillion. But the war is not over there, and it is spreading across central Asia. Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe reported in the Washington Post (U.S. 'secret war' expands globally as Special Operations forces take larger role, June 4, 2010), Special Operations forces are now deployed in 75 countries, up from 60 under Bush...plans to increase Special forces budget to $6.3 billion in 2011...http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/opinion/28douthat.html?sort=recommended&scp=7&sq=u.s.%20iraq%20embassy%20construction&st=cse

'the solution' demanding increased terror needs upsurge in domestic soft power psywar: including political - 'cultural' 'sympathy' support 'our' killer troops propaganda
Soldiers 'handcuffed': Afghan war rules under review
"Why War's Rules are up for review": [hardcopy Sea.Times frt. pg. headline]
With insurgent attacks increasing across Afghanistan, frustration about rules of engagement is growing among troops, and among some members of Congress.
AP Washington Post http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2012321754_afghan10.ht...
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — To the U.S. soldiers getting pounded with mortar rounds in their combat outpost near Kandahar, it seemed like a legitimate request: Allow them to launch retaliatory mortar shells or to summon an airstrike against their attackers. The incoming fire was landing perilously close to a guard station, and the soldiers, using a high-powered camera, could clearly see the insurgents shooting.The response from headquarters — more than 20 miles away — was terse. Permission denied. Battalion-level officers deemed the insurgents too close to a cluster of mud-brick houses, perhaps with civilians inside. Although the insurgents stopped firing before anybody was wounded, the troops were left seething. "This is not how you fight a war, at least not in Kandahar," said a soldier at the outpost who described the incident, which occurred last month, on condition of anonymity. "We've been handcuffed by our chain of command."...
At issue is a tactical directive issued last July byPetraeus' predecessor, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, that limits the use of air and mortar strikes against houses unless personnel are in imminent danger.... to ensure civilians are not in a housing compound before ordering an airstrike. Senior U.S. military officials in Afghanistan and Washington said Petraeus likely won't rescind the directive but instead will issue revised guidance soon to streamline procedures and ensure uniformity in how the rules are implemented.
Despite claims from some relatives of military personnel killed in Afghanistan that the directive has limited the ability of troops to defend themselves, the officials said a review by the U.S. military of every combat death in the past year has found no evidence the rules restricted the use of lifesaving firepower. "We have not found a single situation where a soldier has lost his life because he was not allowed to protect himself," one official said. If troops are in imminent danger, there is no restriction on the use of airstrikes or mortars. "The rules of engagement provide an absolute right of self-defense," the official said....
Although the new directive has markedly reduced the bombing of housing compounds, dozens of Afghan civilians die each year in airstrikes on other types of targets, including vehicles.
For troops on the ground, however, the directive has lowered their morale and limited their ability to pursue insurgents. They note Taliban fighters seem to understand the new rules and have taken to sniping at troops from inside homes or retreating inside houses after staging attacks. "Minimizing civilian casualties is a fine goal, but should it be the be-all and end-all of the policy?" said a junior Army officer in southern Afghanistan. "If we allow soldiers to die in Afghanistan at the hands of a leader who says, 'We're going to protect civilians rather than soldiers,' what's going to happen on the ground? The soldiers are not going to execute the mission to the best of their ability. They won't put their hearts into the mission. That's the kind of atmosphere we're building."... The principal problem, senior officials say, is that U.S. and allied units across Afghanistan have carried out the directive in ways more restrictive than McChrystal intended...

Iraq deja vu: in the face of defeat, eliminate the nation, a plan long in the works
Call for Afghanistan’s partition
A ‘de facto partition’ of Afghanistan is the best policy option available to the United States and its allies, argues Robert D. Blackwill, who served as deputy national security adviser for strategic planning and presidential envoy to Iraq, advised the George W. Bush administration on Afghanistan...also a former US ambassador to India...Mr Blackwill warns the Obama administration’s counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan “seems headed for failure”..."The US polity should stop talking about timelines and exit strategies and accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of its historic stronghold in the Pashtun south...But Washington could ensure that north and west Afghanistan do not succumb to jihadi extremism, using US air power and special forces along with the Afghan army and like-minded nations."

Europe backs Afghanistan strategy aimed at “regionalization”
27 November 2009, www.wsws.org/articles/2009/nov2009/pers-n27.shtm
According to the new German defense secretary, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, the United States and its allies are condemned “to success” in Afghanistan. The deployment is “a litmus test, not only for the transatlantic alliance, but for the entire west,” he has said. The decision by president Obama was preceded by fierce disputes within the American leadership and NATO. The result is not only a substantial increase in troops, but also a new strategy, the precise implications of which are being played down with the term “regionalization”...to put aside “the romantic idea of democratization of the whole country along the lines of the western model” and instead “transfer control of individual provinces step by step to the Afghan security forces.”...at stake is imperialist control of a country that for decades has been of great geopolitical importance due to its location between Iran and the Indian subcontinent and the two most productive oil regions of the world, the Gulf and Central Asia.

Plan To Divide Afghanistan
By Nadeem Malik
ISLAMABAD - The United States has envisaged and is likely to press ahead with its plans of an East Timor-like UN security cover for Afghanistan to ensure its sustained military presence in the region...at least in the short run to allow the post-Taliban government to take hold.... this plan would be pressed into action only when the Taliban regime caves in; and the continued resilience shown so far has unnerved many strategists in the US and Western camps. There has also been talk about a possible parallel government in Afghanistan, with Taliban ruling the entire southern belt and a UN-led government in the north - a division of Afghanistan in a way. This second arrangement looks more likely, as there are no signs of collapse within the Pashtun camp so far.
This plan includes promises of reconstruction of institutions, particularly the creation of an education system and basic infrastructure in the country. The World Bank had already promised to help reconstruction endeavours in Afghanistan. Reports suggest that some members of the Security Council want the UN role to be that of a supporting organization, like the role it played in Cambodia. But US and Britain, sources claimed, are more inclined to have a direct and stronger role - like running the country as the UN did in Kosovo and East Timor. President General Pervez Musharraf is leaving on a six-day visit to France, Britain and United States on Wednesday. He is expected to discuss the future political set-up for Afghanistan with these countries.

Pentagon rethinking value of major counterinsurgencies
...a growing recognition that large-scale counterinsurgency battles have high casualty rates for troops and civilians, eat up equipment that must be replaced and rarely end in clear victory or defeat.... military thinkers say such wars have put the U.S.'s technologically advanced ground forces on the defensive while less sophisticated insurgent forces are able to remain on the offensive. Counterinsurgency "is a good way to get out of a situation gone bad," but it's not the best way to use combat forces, said Andrew Exum, a fellow with the Washington-based Center for a New American Security. "I think everyone realizes counterinsurgency is a losing proposition for U.S. combat troops. I can't imagine anyone would opt for this option."Many Pentagon strategists think that future counterinsurgencies should involve fewer American ground troops and more military trainers, special forces and airstrikes....
The military calls it "foreign internal defense," although some have a pithier name: counterinsurgency light.
The new counterinsurgency is "for the indigenous people and a handful of Americans," said Joseph Collins, a professor at the National Defense University, a Pentagon-funded institution that trains officers and civilians. The newer approach, in Yemen and Pakistan, countries in which U.S. faces entrenched extremist organizations with ties to al Qaida.
In Yemen, where leaders have distanced themselves publicly from the United States, the U.S. has quietly dispatched military trainers to work with Yemeni government forces and has provided air support, largely for observation. In addition, the U.S. sent Yemen $70 million in military aid.
In Pakistan, the Obama administration has authorized a record number of unmanned airstrikes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and promised $7.5 billion in aid over five years. In addition, defense officials said roughly 100 special forces trainers were working with the Pakistani military.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognized the changed thinking in an article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs magazine."The United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan and Iraq anytime soon — that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire," he wrote. More likely, he said, are "scenarios requiring a familiar tool kit of capabilities, albeit on a smaller scale." ... It also, military strategists said, allows the United States to prepare better for a future war that would be fought against another country, not against relatively amorphous terrorist groups. U.S. officials acknowledge that since 9/11 there's been little training for the kind of coordinated land, sea and air battles that have characterized most of the United States' previous conflicts. While no one wants to predict where such a war might be fought, military strategists say that U.S. troops could be involved in battles between India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, and China and Taiwan....
Army Gen. Peter Chiarelli, vice chief of staff of the Army, told Congress earlier this month he thinks it will cost the Army as much as $36 billion to reset itself to be fully prepared for other kinds of warfare. He estimated the job wouldn't be done until 2013.

manufacturing public support for increased u.s. state terror in vain attempt to reverse defeat by national resistance, e.g. 'insurgents','terrorists', etc.
Gen. Petraeus runs into resistance from Karzai over village defense forces
As he takes charge of the war effort in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus has met sharp resistance from President Hamid Karzai to an American plan to assist Afghan villagers in fighting the Taliban on their own...developed under Petraeus's predecessor, ousted Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal...the policy would give the United States and the Interior Ministry authority to pursue a variety of programs, including expanding the pilot projects... villagers trained by U.S. Special Operations forces... Karzai is wary of creating "a force that will be viewed as a private militia."...Senior U.S. officials say the United States would like to expand the program to about two dozen sites across Afghanistan, double the current number... many fear such experiments could lead Afghanistan further into warlordism and out-of-control militias....

Kandahar operation 'will happen more slowly'
The challenges in Kandahar come amid a growing recognition in Kabul and Washington that efforts in neighboring Helmand province to install a new administration in the former Taliban stronghold of Marjah quickly have stumbled. Marjah was meant to be the proving ground for counter-insurgency strategy which emphasizes building governments trusted by local populations over combat operations.... [McChrystal called it a 'bleeding ulcer'] ... on the eve of the Marjah offensive in February, McChrystal described how he planned to bring in a "government in a box."McCrystal insisted that progress was being made in Marjah. But he also conceded that the locals "remain to be convinced" ...

U.S. casualties to mount as Afghan war widens, general says
Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, No. 2 commander in Afghanistan in charge of day-to-day war operations assured that Afghanistan was on the right track despite rising U.S. troop deaths, rampant corruption, growing ethnic tensions, a stalled offensive in Kandahar, a doubtful political solution and a looming July 2011 deadline to show progress...Rodriguez said that increased U.S. casualties should not be interpreted as Afghan regions falling back into the hands of the Taliban. There are currently 93,000 U.S. troops and 48,000 coalition troops in Afghanistan.

...To summarise Panetta: the military occupation is not succeeding because the Afghans don't respect the definition of success and failure that we seek to impose upon them. They don't even live in the same geopolitical conception of reality! What's wrong with them? The Afghans have to understand that the more they confound our efforts, disappoint our expectations and refuse not only our concepts but even the premises underlying those concepts, the more determinedly will we refuse to negotiate meaningfully with them and the more determinedly will we beat our soldiers' heads against the wall while blithely testing our latest weapons systems. In the specific case of the Taliban, there is no alternative other than to keep defeating them so long as they prove impervious to defeat, and doing so more violently and indiscriminately as they gain in strength in reaction...James DeVries, Pontoise, France

NATO 'friendly fire' kills 6 Afghan soldiers
By Mohammad Yaqob (AFP) , 7/7/10
The arrival of General David Petraeus as commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan has focused attention on the rules of engagement, as many soldiers believe a principle of "courageous restraint" is leading to higher casualties. Petraeus's sacked predecessor US General Stanley McChrystal put restrictions on troops, including fewer night raids and air strikes, as well as combat rules, aimed at cutting civilian casualties....

Pakistanis blame US after shrine attack kills 42
"Since America's arrival in Afghanistan, terrorism has come to Pakistan," said Faqir Mohammad, 45, a laborer in the northwest city of Peshawar. "As soon as it quits, peace will come to this region."..."I don't think the U.S. can win the propaganda war," said Hasan-Askari Rizvi, a political and defense analyst
An opinion poll by the International Republican Institute conducted last summer found that 80 percent of Pakistanis believed the country should not cooperate with America in the war on terror. The poll had a margin of error of 1.41 percentage points. The U.S. Embassy said the Lahore attack "demonstrates the terrorists' blatant disregard for the lives of the Pakistani people and the future of this country" and that the U.S. "will continue to support Pakistan in the fight against a common enemy."

A Smarter Weapon
Why two retired military officers believe it’s essential that the next president use outreach, good deeds and a strong military to make the United States safer.
By Anthony C. Zinni and Leighton W. Smith Jr.http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/03/a-smarter-weapo.html#more

'Soft Power' Godfather Joseph Nye on Obama's use of hard and soft power and what he learned from Henry Kissinger
By Gabor Steingart and Gregor Peter Schmitz
We should not play off the hard strategies against the soft strategies. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the strategy in her testimony before the U.S. Senate as the "three D's": defense, diplomacy, development -- in that order....
Network of Democracy Research Institutes, January 2010
The Network of Democracy Research Institutes is an association of organizations that conduct research on democracy, democratization, and related topics in comparative government and international affairs. Included in the Network are independent institutions, university-based study centers, and research programs affiliated with political parties, labor unions, and democracy and human rights movements, and other organizations. The Network is a membership association of institutions that conduct and publish research on democracy and democratic development. It is also one of several functional networks associated with the World Movement for Democracy (www.wmd.org). Additional information about the Network and profiles of member institutes are available at www.wmd.org/ndri/ndri.html.

Soft Power
26 November-December 2006  Military review
Michael J. Zwiebel,Director of Range Infrastructure and Investments, U.S. Army Developmental Test Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, holds M.A. in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College...
...the sovereign state has many instruments of power available to it, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DiMe) instruments. in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph nye, a former assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs and a recognized expert on international affairs and the effects of soft power, provides some useful observations on power and its relationship to the sovereign state "..soft power, it must be said, is not an exclusive replacement for hard power... can strengthen applications of hard power and be less expensive...can be directed at either an opposing state or at its individual citizens.... public diplomacy is one form of soft power employed..."
5. United States Information Agency “What is Public Diplo- macy,” .
8. The USIAAA public diplomacy website provides examples of programs used today “Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs,” 1
10. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, 3 (May-June 2004): 16.
24. Broadcasting Board of Governors, “9/11 Commission Report Cites Successes of U.S. International Broadcasting; Calls for Increased Funding.”
25. USAID established 1961 by presidential executive order after President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act into law.
27. Department of State, “New USAID Director for Middle East Public Diplomacy,” 6 April 2004, .
29.“USAID Launches New Middle East Outreach Initiative With Media Summit,” 18 May 2004,.

an eye-opening, arrogant account of U.S. soft power psywar
The Networker: Afghanistan’s first media mogul.
by Ken Auletta July 5, 201 www.kenauletta.com
Saad Mohseni’s shows entertain and liberalize. “One of the reasons Afghanistan has not exploded is that the media give people an outlet,” he says...
Every day in Kabul, politicians and journalists in search of information come to a barricaded dead-end street in the Wazir Akbar Khan district to see Saad Mohseni, the chairman of Moby Group, Afghanistan’s preëminent media company. At the last house on the right, burly men carrying AK-47s lead them up creaky stairs to a small second-floor office. Mohseni, a gregarious man with a politician’s habits, often stands up to greet visitors with a hug, then returns to his desk, where a BlackBerry, two cell phones, and a MacBook Air laptop are constantly lit up; fifteen small flat-screen TVs, set to mute, are mounted on the office walls.... he listens as intently as a psychiatrist, gathering information from an intricate network of sources: government and anti-government Afghans, American officials, foreign correspondents, diplomats, intelligence operatives, reporters, business and tribal and even Taliban leaders....
“Saad is the nexus of everything going through Kabul,” Tom Freston, co-founder of MTV and a member of Moby’s board, says. “Besides the television business, he knows every foreign correspondent.”... Mohseni’s company owns Tolo TV and Arman radio, the country’s most popular TV and radio networks. It also owns a music-recording company, a second TV network, an advertising agency, a television and movie production company, the magazine Afghan Scene, and two Internet cafés. Next month, it expects to launch Tolo News, a twenty-four-hour satellite news channel. In 2009, it partnered with Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation to create the Farsi1 satellite network, which packages entertainment programs in Dubai and beams them from England into Iran. In fact, Mohseni has been called the Rupert Murdoch of Afghanistan, and though the comparison is extravagant, it gives a sense of his influence and ambition... He is implacably opposed to the Taliban and staunchly pro-American, provoking accusations that he’s an American agent....
Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, describes the tension between Mohseni’s values and those of Afghan traditionalists: “The country is highly illiterate, highly religious, and highly traditional. And Saad is appealing to and creating a new young group of people in the urban areas. There’s a brilliance to what he’s doing, but it’s also risky..." ...
This helps to explain the influx of American capital. Aside from the Mohseni family, the biggest contributor to construction costs for Arman radio and Tolo TV is the U.S. Agency for International Development. A portion of Moby’s advertising budget comes from foreign governments and N.G.O.s; recruitment ads for the Afghan Army and police are designed by Lapis, Moby’s ad agency, and paid for by the U.S. through the Afghan government... without U.S. government financing for infrastructure Moby would not exist. (The State Department has budgeted seventy-two million dollars this fiscal year for “communications and public diplomacy” in Afghanistan.) U.S.A.I.D. sponsors “On the Road,” a weekly reality show. The show, which airs Saturday nights on Tolo, is hosted by an affable twenty-two-year-old named Mujeeb Arez, who travels through Afghanistan by jeep—often on highways freshly paved by U.S.A.I.D. funds—talking with residents and exploring local customs, delicacies, and indigenous commerce. (In areas where it is too dangerous to travel by jeep, U.S.A.I.D. has supplied a helicopter to ferry the crew.) Mohseni is quick to point out that U.S.A.I.D. sponsors only this one half-hour program out of a hundred and twelve hours of weekly prime-time programming on his two TV channels. Next season, however, the State Department will pay for another program, about “cops who may be tempted by bribes but don’t take them,” David Ensor, the director of communications and public diplomacy at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, says. A major reason for the Karzai government’s unpopularity is the perception that corruption is condoned, particularly among the police. The show, Ensor explains, is meant to help recruit police by demonstrating “that cops can be heroes.”[...]

CIA without news of Osama bin Laden for almost 9 years
" Recall it was on the pretext of avenging the 9/11 victims and capturing Osama bin Laden that President Bush ordered the Afghanistan offensive..."
In an interview with ABC News Senior White House Correspondent Jake Tapper on “This Week” (27 June 2010), CIA Director Leon Panetta said the last time the CIA had “precise information" on Osama bin Laden was when he left Afghanistan to cross into Pakistan (late 2001).Recruited by the CIA in 1979, Osama bin Laden - of Yemeni-Saudi nationality and a businessman at the time - was in charge of financing the Afghan Mujahideen against the Communists. He purportedly turned against the United States during Operation Desert Storm (1991), and has been tracked down by the CIA ever since. However, contradicting the official account, he was hospitalised in August 2001 at the American Hospital in Dubai, under CIA protection, where he received the visit of various political figures.The Agency and the political establishment consider him to be the mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks. However, again contradicting the official version, the FBI’s most wanted fugitive list does not feature OBL in connection with 9/11. Over the past decade, various audio and video tapes have been attributed by the CIA to Osama bin Laden. However, in contradiction with this official story as well, Swiss experts from The Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence established that the tapes were all fake....